


Criminology and Security

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My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous.... (Foucault, in Rabinow, 1984: 343).

Have you ever read any criminological texts? They are staggering. And I say this out of astonishment, not aggressiveness, because I fail to comprehend how the discourse of criminology has been able to go on at this level. One has the impression that it is of such utility, is needed so urgently and rendered so vital for the working of the system, that it does not even seek a theoretical justification for itself, or even simply a coherent framework. It is entirely utilitarian (Foucault, 1980:47).

The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety), by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary (Mencken, 1918:18).

Introduction

Criminology's most fundamental topic has long been security, understood in Hobbesian terms Hobbes' (1651/1968:185-186) as interpersonal safety -- with the embedded implication of freedom from the fear of interpersonal harms -- and the peaceful coexistence that this enables.¹ While the meaning of "security" has varied considerably over time and across disciplines (see the papers in this volume), this core meaning of interpersonal safety and peaceful coexistence (that is has recently been the focus of the "new" "human security" (United Nations, 1994; Wood and Shearing, 2007)) has been remarkably consistent within criminology, though, as we will see, the term "security" has not been as prominent as it has been within other areas of enquiry, such as international relations.

Historically, criminology has explored security by focusing its attention on what one might think of as "hitting and taking" harms, typically thought of as "crimes", that threaten peaceful coexistence along with the governance processes, particularly criminal justice, that have been developed to respond to them. This focus has ensured that individuals have long been at the centre of criminological analyses of security. Criminology's crime focus has meant that, while a concern with security, understood as safety, has long been central to criminology, it has been the term "crime", rather than "security", that has held pride of place on the criminological stage, as the term "criminology" itself makes clear.

¹ Hobbes (1651/ 1986) likens security to fine weather, which is said to be fine, not only because it is not inclement at the moment but because it is likely to remain clear for some time.



In recent thinking that have sought to “decriminalize criminology” (Shearing, 1989) -- see for example Hillyard et al.’s (2004) use of the term “zemiology” and “harmology” and Ditton’s (1979) earlier use of “controlology” -- “security” as a term, has, for the most part, been eschewed as criminology has explored ways of moving beyond its self-definition as a crime-ology.² Today, while the term “security” has gained greater currency within criminology, its synonym “safety” has emerged as a preferred term both within criminology, and within its associated practical politics. For example “safety” is being used increasingly to cushion the implications of “national security”, within its state rather than individual focus, which criminologists sense remains embedded in the term “security” – for example, in the phrase “the safety and security web” used in the recently released report on the “Future of Canadian Policing Models” (Council of Canadian Academies, 2014) commissioned by the Canadian Government’s Department of Public Safety.

In this chapter we explore the history of “crime” and “security” and how it is that “security” has begun to move closer to the centre of the criminological stage. Central to these developments, we will argue, has been criminology’s “utilitarian” character, which Foucault so caustically depreciates, and the way in which its “use-inspired” (Stokes, 1997) nature, to use a less acerbic term, has coupled developments within criminology to the shifting priorities of practical politics. In developing our arguments, our focus will be on criminology within English-speaking contexts as it is here that contemporary criminology has been primarily shaped.

The emergence of a crime-centred criminology

A practical politics that proved to be particularly influential in constituting criminology’s established crime focus, within English-speaking contexts, was the development of the New Police within the City of London at the beginning of the 19th century. These New Police emerged in London as a consequence of widespread concern about the inadequacy of the existing mechanisms for governing safety (Emsley, 1986). The existing potpourri of arrangements, which had been developed previously within rural and feudal contexts, was proving to be inadequate within urban contexts (Beattie, 2006; Critchley, 1978; Radzinowicz, 1956). A particular concern, at the time, were ad hoc initiatives, such as the businesses of thief-taking, which involved private sector entrepreneurs offering the return of stolen goods for a fee, goods that they had often arranged to be stolen in the first place (Beattie, 2006; Zedner, 2006).

The long and the short of these concerns, and responses to them, was the development of a plan, by influential policing reformers (early criminologists), for policing arrangements that would eschew the backward-looking strategies that initiatives such as thief-taking offered, that Leman-Langlois and Shearing (2003) have termed “repairing the past”, to more forward-

² For an exception, see Wood and Shearing’s (2007) and Johnston and Shearing’s (2003) discussion of the “governance of security”.



looking arrangements that would “repair the future”. The core idea informing these plans for a New Police was the development of a police organization dedicated to preventing disturbances of “the peace” – “peace” was a term that Hobbes (1651/1968:186) used in the mid-1600s to designate a state of interpersonal safety -- within the City of London, which was then, as it is today, a relatively small geographic area, “a city within a city”.

These New Police were to “keep the peace” by establishing conditions that would promote safety. The core of these conditions was to be the establishment of a pervasive system of surveillance – that Radzinowics (1968:164) has termed “an unremitting watch” – across the City of London. This “watch” was to be accomplished by instituting a “beat” system that would distribute police officers across the City (Grimshaw & Jefferson, 1987). This arrangement would, it was believed, establish a pervasive police gaze that would deter potential wrongdoers committing crimes, because detection would be certain, a crucial condition for effective deterrence identified by Beccaria (1996).

So confident was Sir Robert Peel, the British Home Secretary who instituted these arrangements, of the success of this venture that few provisions were made to enable these “Bobbies on the beat” (a term that derived from “Bob”, the shortened version of “Robert”) to respond to crimes after they had occurred – for example, there was no provision for police investigators who would investigate crimes (Beattie, 2006: 31-32).

What transpired in practice deviated considerably from these plans. The “Peelers” (another nickname given to these New Police) found it exceedingly difficult in practice to establish the unremitting watch that they had been established to create. The flies in Peel’s ointment were the “institutions of privacy” (Stinchcombe, 1963), particularly those associated with private property.

These institutions established legal restrictions that kept Peel’s New Police on public streets, and off private property, effectively restricting their watch to what transpired in public places. These restrictions placed Peel’s “Bobbies” in a Catch 22 predicament -- they were required to establish an unremitting watch within a context of a combination of physical and legal barriers that prevented them from realizing this objective.

The source of this difficulty was the model of Marine Police (also known as the Thames River Police), a policing arrangement that was thought to have been very successful, that had inspired the police reformers (Barrie, 2008; Radzinowicz, 1956; Reynolds 1998). What the architects of the New Police had not paid sufficient attention to, in their plans, was just how different the context, within which the Marine Police operated, was to the context within which their New Police would operate. Unlike Peel’s police, the Marine Police was a private sector organization that operated primarily on private property, with authorized access to both public and private spaces.



The response of the New Police to their restrictive physical barriers, such as walls and doors, and to their restrictive legal context, was to shift their role from one of pre-emptive and pervasive surveillance to that of post-crime responders who would come to the aid of victims of crime. At the heart of this post-crime response was the identification of offenders who had committed crimes so that they could be brought before courts where they would they would receive their “just deserts” (von Hirsch, 1993) – ironically this meant that the New Police very quickly evolved into a form of “thief-takers” (what the Canadian Police Chief James Harding has termed “bandit-catchers”), albeit ones who did not provide for the return of property but rather became the “front end” of an emerging criminal justice system. While this meant that the New Police did not realise their founding mission, this shift went a long way to ameliorate the considerable opposition to the possibility of an unremitting watch.

It is this role as bandit-catchers, rather than as unremitting watchers, that has become the model that police organizations have followed in Britain and in many other countries – in part because of the reach that British colonialism enabled. Accordingly, these developments, though very space-time specific, have been very influential in shaping the way in which the governance of safety has come to be understood within criminology. Indeed, they have proved to have had a very long tail, which has shaped criminology as a crime-ology rather than as a safety-ology or, if one accepts the “governance of security” language of Wood and Shearing (2007:6) and Johnston and Shearing (2003:9), as a security-ology.

As a consequence of these development in safety governance, criminology has fashioned for itself a conceptual box, focused on the governance of interpersonal hitting and taking that Brodeur (1983) has termed, “low policing”. This box has shaped criminology into an area of enquiry that has been concerned primarily, and at times almost exclusively, with bandit-catching, blaming and punishing and how these processes might be improved both in terms of effectiveness and propriety. With this use-inspired conceptual narrowing criminology has for many years firmly cemented itself into a crime-ology frame that has shaped, and continues to shape, its research and thinking.

In developing its value for safety governors (largely governments), criminology has drawn primarily on sociology and psychology to develop theories of bandits, bandit-catching, bandit-catchers, blamers and correctors (in particularly punishers) to assist these governors to more effectively, and legitimately, “govern through crime” (Simon, 2007). In developing its methods, criminology has drawn on the same disciplinary sources as it has for its theories. While there has been considerable interest in the use of qualitative methodologies of anthropology and sociology (Shearing and Marks, 2011), criminology’s primary methodological tools have been quantitative ones. This quantitative tendency, which has always been strong within American criminology, has become stronger over the past decade. This has led to the emergence of a particularly strong quantitative research culture within



criminology that has been organized under signs such as “computational criminology” (Birks, 2005), “experimental criminology” (Sherman, 2009), and “crime science” (Laycock, 2003).

This development is having a major impact on the way in which questions of effectiveness and propriety are being explored within criminology. Indeed, this stance has been steadily encroaching on the well established, and more legal and philosophical terrain of “critical criminology” (Taylor, Walton & Young, 1975/2011) that has focused in particular on issues of propriety and its relationship with effectiveness. An example of this can be found in the experimental criminology research that is being currently being conducted under the sign “procedural justice” – a concept that was explored earlier by philosopher John Rawls (1971) in his “Theory of Justice”. Within criminology this term has become associated with the experimental work of the legal psychologist, Tom Tyler (2006) and a growing body of work that is seeking to extend his ideas and findings (for example, Murphy, 2004). These developments have done much to cement criminology as a crime-ology that is in the process of becoming a “crime science” providing evidence-based guidance to governments.

This story points to several “strengths” (or “weaknesses”, depending on ones perspective). These include a defining focus on after-the-fact crime control as the route to safety, which provides an integrating thread within criminology and constitutes a shared criminological identity. “Criminology”, as one of our colleagues, said to one of us recently, “is about crime and what to do about it”. This identity has proved symbolically and financially beneficial. Criminology departments within universities often have among the highest undergraduate and diploma student enrolments and have often been able to persuade governments to be major supporters of their use-inspired research – for example, the British Home Office has proved over the years to be an extraordinarily lucrative source of research funding for British criminology.

From criminalities to securities

A variety of voices within criminology are beginning to argue – often implicitly – that if criminology remains within its established crime-focused framings it will not be in a position recognize, let alone respond to the shifting landscape of insecurities, and their associated securities, that emerged in the 20th century and are defining the current century. As we turn to examine these voices we, inevitably, encounter a language conundrum, something of a Gordian knot, that is difficult to untangle – for a recent discussion of the difficulties involved in surmounting established nomenclatures, and the framing they cement, see Albrecht and Moe (2014).

This challenge arises because the established criminological language -- that we have relied upon to this point in the chapter, of “crime”, “harms”, “safety”, “justice”, “criminal justice” and so on -- is the language of the terrain criminology is hesitantly moving beyond. It is difficult – as Hegel’s (1967:63) oft quoted line, “the owl of Minerva spreads its wings only



with the falling of the dusk", reminds us – to develop a new language, while still embedded in the old. Faced with this conundrum we will use the new terms within an emerging new criminology, even though the meanings of these terms, as we will see, often remain vague and are contested.

A central theme that unites the emerging voices questioning established conceptions within criminology has been that criminology needs to lift its gaze beyond crime, and its management. Three sub-themes, all of which are grounded in a practical politics to which criminology has responded, can also be detected. The first is the argument that the governance of both the old securities and new securities, has become, and should become, more multilateral both within governments (“whole-of-government”) and beyond government (“whole-of-society”). The second argues that the governance of security, again both old and new, has shifted, and should shift, away from its traditional backwards-looking approach to a more forward-looking, pre-emptive approach that seeks to mitigate harms before they occur. A third argument is that criminology should include within its gaze thing-to-human and human-to-thing engagements and not simply human-to-human ones.

A conceptual event that has proved to be remarkably influential in shifting criminology away from its established framing was the publication of Ulrich Beck’s “The Risk Society” (Beck, 1992). While not a criminological text, Beck’s work has had a significant impact on criminological thinking, especially in regard to the second and third of these sub-themes. At the heart of Beck’s thesis was the argument that there has been a significant change in the nature of harms that humans have had to contend with since the 19th century European state-building era that proved to be so important in shaping criminology. For Beck, at the heart of this change has been a fundamental shift in the nature of the harms that humans face. Contemporary harms, he argued, have shifted from harms with relatively limited impacts, for which a backward-looking harm governance is appropriate, to harms with consequences that are much more dangerous and for which the emerging (and appropriate) stance is to act to prevent them before they occur. What this has meant, Beck argued, is that managing harms after they have occurred has given way to managing risks – that is, to managing the possibilities of harm before they are realised (Beck, 1992).

Two criminologists who have been at the forefront of exploring the implications of these developments for security and its governance have been Jonathan Simon (2007) and Pat O’Malley (2004; 2008), both of whom have explored the various, and often contesting ways that risks are identified and managed and the implications of this for harm governance.

Another example of an enormously influential criminologist who actively explored the implications of this shift for criminology was Richard Ericson (1994; 2007) who, shortly before his untimely death, turned his attention to the insurance industry -- a risk-managing industry that he (and his collaborators) described as “*the institution of governance beyond the state*” (Ericson, Doyle & Barry, 2003:45, original emphasis). As Ericson and other



insurance scholars have noted, insurance seeks to, on the one hand, enable its clients to recognize risks before they materialize and by becoming members of risk pools who collectively put aside resources that will enhance their resilience in the face of harms and, on the other, to act to manage in ways that will reduce the likelihood of their realization (Heimer, 1989; Ewald, 1991). Together, these and other risk-focused criminological scholars, have been actively reshaping criminology in ways that are establishing it as a risk-ology, and a security-ology, as well as a crime-ology.

To return to the first of our sub-themes: a development that predates Beck's writing, that is firmly grounded in a practical politics, has been the study "private security" (see Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011; White, 2011 for discussions of the extent and financial worth of this industry). Both the industry itself, and scholars who have studied it, have used the term "security" as a way of distinguishing this set of institutions from those of the public police. A key distinguishing feature of this industry, that many scholars have identified, is its concern with managing risk – a role that is reminiscent of the intended role of Peel's New Police. While, this industry does sometimes engage in services that are similar to those of police (Rigakos, 2002) – for example, when they provide clients with emergency assistance -- for the most part the focus of private security has been, and is, preventative.

The tactics used by private security are very often intended to produce an "unremitting watch" – for example the widespread use of surveillance cameras in a wide variety of settings. An instructive example, referred to by Shearing and Stenning (1980) some years ago, is the widespread use of surveillance, not to identify wrongdoing but rather to identify opportunities for wrongdoing, that, if left unattended, might lead to wrongdoing – see also Shearing and Stenning's (1987) analysis of embedded risk managing ordering in Disney World. Yet another example of embedded ordering intended to maintain order, rather than respond to breaches of order, can be found in tactics that have been developed to maintain desired orders within cyberspace (Lessig, 1996; Dupont, 2013) that have been developed largely by private "auspices" and "providers" of security governance (Bayley and Shearing, 2001).

As these and similar developments have emerged, so too has the term "security" emerged as a preferred nomenclature for referencing forward-looking, risk-focused forms of security governance and for the auspices and providers who engage in this form of security governance. An analytic outcome of thinking about the emergence of a diversity of auspices and providers of safety across public, private and community sectors has been discussion around the notion of "nodal governance" (Burriss et al., 2005) as an approach that enables criminologists to theorize the emergence of security governance as a multilateral and plural domain of governance (Bayley and Shearing, 2001).



Although these proactive, forward-looking developments have been, to a large extent, pioneered by auspices and providers of security within the private sector, a discernable shift in this direction can be detected within public sector ordering initiatives within the realm of low-policing. Together these developments have begun to significantly loosen the hold that the established backward-looking crime-focus has had on the institutions of criminal justice and, accordingly, on criminology. There are several established domains within public sector low policing where this is becoming evident.

One of the most significant developments has been the emergence of what has been termed “environmental criminology” – a criminology that has drawn inspiration from architectural thinkers like Jane Jacobs (1970) and Oscar Newman (1972). A number of criminological scholars -- for example, Clarke (1997), Felson and Boba (2010), Cornish (1994) and the Brantinghams (1981) -- have sought to encourage governments to pay greater attention to the shaping of opportunities, especially through re-designing the physical environment that enable crimes, so as to make criminal wrongdoing less likely. There are strong resonances here with the preventative activities of private security, except that the focus here has tended to be state-centric and has, for this reason, continued to be crime-focused. A common thread, however, is the forward-looking, anticipatory and risk-focused approach to this preventative crime governance – a focus that it shares with broader crime prevention initiatives (Waller & Sansfacon, 2000). An important, and influential line of thinking and research within environmental criminology, that resonates with Peel’s unremitting watch, has focused attention on the presence (and absence) of “capable guardians” who can, and do, limit opportunities for crime (Felson, 1995; Eck, 1995; Eck and Eck, 2012; Reynald, 2011).

As developments such as these have focused attention on anticipating and avoiding harms, so too has the use of the terms “security” and “security governance” increasingly been used to refer to what was thought of as “peace” and “peace keeping”. Further these older terms themselves have interestingly been resurrected and put to use in post-conflict contexts where the terms peacekeeping and peacebuilding have become ubiquitous. As these developments have taken place there has been a growing disinclination for scholars, and practitioners, to use terms such as “crime fighting”, “war on crime”, “law enforcement”, and so on. It is not that crime and its related terms are no longer being used. Rather they are being used to designate a particular form of security governance – namely, Simon’s “governing through crime” (2007) -- rather than security governance more generally. This shift in understanding, and its expression in language, is nicely illustrated by some of the titles being used to label criminological programmes. For example, University College London’s Department of “Security and Crime Science” and the University of Liverpool’s Singapore campus’ programme in “Criminology and Security”.

This shift to “security”, as a descriptor, is also evident within institutions of security governance across both the private and public sectors. A recent example of this has been



the establishment, by the US government, of the Department of Homeland Security. This Department, established in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, reflects a Beck-like understanding of the shifting nature of contemporary harms that extend significantly beyond crime. In line with this broad ambit the Department consolidated 22 existing agencies only some of which were policing and justice agencies, for example, the Government's "Energy Security" and "Assurance Program".

While a broad security focus is certainly not new to governments, - as the US Central Intelligence Agency makes clear – what is now emerging is a blurring of lines that have traditionally been used to separate the security governance of high policing and the crime governance of low policing. This is at once redefining low policing at the same time as it is creating a host of new domains that "security" is being used to describe – for example, food security, water security, and energy security. This is not the only evidence of this sort of an explicit reframing by governments of the way in which they understand the governance of security and how it should be practiced. Another example, found in the US' northern neighbour, is the recent adoption of the name Department of Public Safety by the Government of Canada for the federal department responsible for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

This move to "security", and the associated shift away from "crime", across both the private and public sectors has been enabled by, and is enabling, a broadening of criminology's domain beyond Hobbes' hitting and taking harms. As noted, this shift has been accompanied by a growing concern with risks of harms and how these might be mitigated. As this broadening has occurred, the term "security" has been increasingly drawn upon to give expression to these new framings (Valverde and Wood 2001). Similarly, as this has happened, criminology has been tentatively exploring a new life for itself as a risk-ology and security-ology.

In the next section we explore further the link between security and risk within criminological thinking.

Security and risk

As we have suggested, the changes that have been taking place with respect to security governance can in part be accounted for by a broadening of the notion of safety beyond the hitting and taking harms that Hobbes conceived of as a foundational order. Understandings of safety have been, and are being, broadened to include a wider array of social, economic and environmental conditions (Wood and Shearing, 2007; Neocleous, 2008; Lynch and Stretesky, 2014).



By the end of the 19th century the developmental boom in most of the western world (in terms of economy, science and technology) brought with it two important risk related changes (Foucault 1978:15). First, as a result of wage earning workers and the complexities of ownership and service delivery, third-party liability, as opposed to individual liability, became a necessary transformation in civil law structures. This is simply because there were now a number of harms that had no clear harm-doer, and thus could be described as accidents. Secondly, because no existing civil claims fit the bill for this type of harm, forms of 'no fault' protection were created. This signalled the start of social insurance, accident insurance and a new era for risk governance. Prior to this development, risk was understood as a simple zero sum equation between the harmed and the harmer. The idea of objective risks, unrelated to the moral character of individuals, encountered by all who participated in the modern economy, was a view forwarded by a range of intellectual experts like sociologists, criminologists, historians and economists.

What the idea of risk brought to the table was a calculable predicting arm to security analyses. As a consequence of this academic work, by criminologists and others, the exploration of risk and security took many different directions. At the *Symposium of the Future of Risk*, held in 2012 at the Chicago Centre for Contemporary Theory, Bernard Harcourt listed five different directions that the theory on risk has since taken.

One of has been the "re-individualization of risks" (Harcourt, 2012). In the welfare state, risks were shared among the members of solidarity groups, while neo-liberalism, it has been argued, has tended to disaggregate these collectives, arguing that individuals should manage their risks themselves both rationally and proactively (Harcourt, 2012). As suggested by O'Malley (2004), rational risk management came to be associated with the market and with entrepreneurial individuals, rather than with the regulatory institutions of the state compensating for market failures.

With these neo-liberal developments risk began to emerge as a tool for exclusion as well as inclusion. With the identification of risk groups came the second splinter, the responsibilization of risk (Harcourt, 2012). By way of example, within the insurance industry, social profiles are constructed (age, gender, residential suburb) that are then used to label persons and organizations as forming part of a risk group. This categorization, together with statistical and actuarial knowledge, is used to price risks and assess premiums of risk bearers who wish to join, and gain the protection of, the risk pools that insurance companies establish and manage (Heimer, 1989; Ericson, Doyle and Barry, 2003; Harcourt, 2012).

Another direction that the risk conversation has taken has been to consider practices that embrace risk rather than simply fear it (Baker and Simon 2002). These practices view uncertainty as a challenge to be mastered not simply as the source of potential harms to be avoided. The works of Pat O'Malley (2004), in particular, provide instructive examples of how risk can be imagined, re-imagined and portrayed in both negative and positive ways. As



a way of illustrating his analysis of the system that has emerged to govern responsible driving, O'Malley (2009) pictures a governmental system that works efficiently with very limited disciplinary and individualizing elements. This enables him to develop an analysis of risk-related practices as constituting governmental technologies that require, and can benefit from, criminological analysis and critique. Similarly scholars have explored how non-state forms of security governance, such as the international movement for Restorative Justice, may benefit from future-focused risk management developments (Johnston and Shearing 2003, Froestad and Shearing, 2013).

Today so much is being done and governed in the name of risk and security that it is difficult to identify a single set of goals or ethical foundations that underlie these risk governance practices. O'Malley suggests, in the face of this diversity, that it is more appropriate to view risk as an abstract theoretical construct that is fundamentally shaped by its social, political and other space-time environments. In developing his arguments for a risk-focused criminology, O'Malley (2008) proposed building on a governmentality approach that will focus attention on how different categories of risks are governed.

Another direction is that of risk avoidance through risk management (Harcourt, 2012). Neocleous (2008) echoing Wildavsky's (1988: 1) observation that risk is so often treated as "a bad thing", "rather than as an inevitably mixed phenomenon from which considerable good, as well as harm, is derived", warns against the assumption, inherent in the notion of security, that safety is by definition a good thing (see also Baker and Simon 2002; Loader, 2009). He cautions that accepting this assumption binds criminology too tightly to the utilitarian motivations of traditional security studies, where the goal becomes doing "security" better rather than gaining a better understanding of security and its governance as social practices. As an alternative, like both O'Malley (2004) and Valverde (2010), Neocleous (2008: 4), following Foucault, proposes that security should be viewed not as a value or an aspiration, but rather as a mode of governing.

What these, and similar, risk scholars argue is that what is done in the name of security has, not only shaped society, but that this shaping has, and is taking place through a particular ideological lens. For Neocleous, central to this shaping is a state-centric ideology. He argues that it is important that scholars "...get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimizes state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives." (2008:185). For Neocleous it is important to consider "desecuritisation" as a possible pathway – this is an old theme within the practical politics of criminology where there have long been arguments to decriminalize harms. An example are the arguments by Schur and Maher for a policy of "radical non-intervention" (Schur & Maher, 1974) for some crimes as a way of avoiding the escalation of harms, which labelling theorists such as Howard Becker (1963) and Edwin Lemert (2010) argue are all too often a consequence of crime-ising harms.



Finally, a major direction of risk studies has been the management risks (Harcourt, 2012). Technologies for managing risk have often involved relying on the calculations, or the research, of some designated expert authority regarding a specific risk, and then making adjustments to ones actions in light of their technical specifications. An example would be the directions that are offered with respect to seat belts use to avoid injury or death in automobile accidents, which have persuaded many people to wear these belts. Another example would be the high walls and electric gates that have become so ubiquitous in many parts of the world to safeguard the security of persons and property from unwanted intrusion.

These habitual practices that follow from expert knowledge and the “expert systems” (Giddens, 1990) to which this knowledge gives rise have become a ubiquitous part of the governance of security. Beck, (1992; 2000) in seeking to understand the governance of security, views risk, and the harms associated with them, in terms of three time periods: pre-modernization, modernization, and reflexive modernization. In each of these periods, risk is framed differently and this framing shapes the governance of security.

Risk in the pre-modern period was seen as something that we could not control, something caused by gods or daemons or simply an act of nature. Risk in the modernized world was viewed as a probability to be calculated (Bernstein, 1996). According to Beck, modernized societies have reached a point of reflexivity that arises from the trajectory of their development. This has introduced a third time period, of reflexive-modernization, that is forming the basis for the way risk is viewed and security governed today. Today risks are a consequence of the risk governance processes of yester year. They reflect “the hazards and insecurities of modernisation itself” (Beck 1992: 21). This idea is captured by the notion that we are now living within a new geological era, the “Anthropocene” (a terms proposed by Steffen et al., 2007; see also Steffen et al., 2011) in which human activity has become a very influential driver of earth systems. Within this era, as Beck has argued, many of the most fundamental risks that humans face today are ones that they have created though their engagements with earth systems. These new risks, it is argued, require very different processes of risk management from, for example, the actuarial practices that lie at the heart of commercial insurance, as a security governance enterprise that assumes stable systems that have not been, and that cannot be, affected by human engagements with them.

The central thrust of the work of these scholars has not simply been to move beyond crime, but to shift the focus of criminology to risks and risk management. In doing so they have not argued that conventional crimes and criminal justice processes are not important, but rather that criminology should broaden its focus beyond its established, 19th century-based, conception of harms and responses to them.

Security and the Anthropocene



At the heart of Beck's analysis, as we have noted, was his argument that the nature of the risks humans face has recently changed drastically and that this shift was ushering in different understandings of security and its governance. The emblematic example of this change for Beck is the earth's shift from the Holocene era to the Anthropocene – although Beck did not use these terms.

During the Holocene era humans took for granted, and treated as unproblematic, the largely benign patterns of outputs from earth systems -- they treated these outputs as simply the way things are. Humans, in Heidegger's (1977) words, treated the earth as a "standing reserve" – as a warehouse of goods that will never be, and can never be, emptied, and so would always be available for their use. This "reserve" required no maintenance and would quite simply be there for humans to draw upon for whatever they required for their bio-physical well-being. Certainly, humans had many concerns about how best to tap into these resources and how best to make things from them, but the extraction and waste processes of this take, make and waste paradigm were not of concern to them.

What Beck identified, and what the term "Anthropocene" signals, is a dramatic shift in an understanding of earth systems and the location of humans in relation to them. This emerging understanding of humans - as not only integral to bio-physical systems but as hugely influential drivers of these processes and their outcomes - goes against the grain of well established understandings (both popular and social science) of humans as essentially "social" and "spiritual" beings rather than as fundamentally bio-physical beings who have had, and are having, a profound impacts on bio-physical systems. This includes the ecological support systems (Heidegger's "standing reserve") that humans rely upon for their well-being and the functioning of the social systems that they have, as bio-physical beings, created.

As criminology begins increasingly to view itself as a "risk-ology" it is beginning, following Beck (1992), to rethink its understandings of the risks, and associated securities, that it should explore. One consequence of this, that is beginning to be visible, is the emergence of "green criminology" (White 2009) – also termed "conservation criminology" (Gibbs et al., 2010). As this happens an additional, and deeper, foundational order – in addition to the Hobbesian interpersonal foundational order -- is beginning to be identified by criminologists (White, 2009; Ngoc and Wyatt, 2012; South and Brisman, 2013), namely, the bio-physical order of ecological services, and related earth system boundaries that cannot be breached if human well-being is to be safeguarded -- see for example, Rockström et al. (2009) planetary boundaries and the associated idea developed by Raworth (2012:7) of a "safe and just space for humanity". This conception of a safe space for human existence provides an ecological basis for concepts such as "environmental security" (see Lynch and Stretesky 2011) – a term that has been used within the international relations literature since the late 1970s and 1980s and has since been deployed by the Copenhagen School (Buzan et al., 1998; see also Dalby 2002).



It is to this emerging idea of a foundational order of ecological services -- that terms such as “food security”, “water security”, “energy security”, and so on -- have been pointing. As criminology begins to recognise the importance of a bio-physical foundational order this has given impetus to the shift towards the forward-looking risk focus that the term “security” has come to signify. What is emerging, within practical politics and criminology, is both a return to the Hobbesian forward-looking focus on security and its governance and a broadening of his conception of order from a foundational order of interpersonal peace to one that includes a bio-physical “peace”.

Cybersecurity

Before bringing this chapter to a close we turn to yet another shift in focus within criminology that we have already alluded to, namely, the emergence of what has come to be termed cyberspace (Dupont, 2013). This space is a digital, electronic space populated by digital entities. As humans enter this space they find themselves transformed into such entities. As with the bio-physical world of the Anthropocene, here too a distinct shift in conception and language and has been taking place. The emergence of cyberspace, as a focus of attention within security studies, has given birth to yet another security, namely “cybersecurity” and the emergency of “cybersecurity strategies” (Bayuk et al., 2012; O’Connell, 2012). The language of governance in relation to this world that has emerged is very clearly the language of “security” and the “risks” that threaten it. What is sought here, as with the New Police, is the absence of harm, and the emerging governance strategies are focused on how to realise such an absence.

Benoit Dupont (2013), a leading criminologist who has concerned himself with cyberspace, recently undertook an analysis of the language used, using automated text analysis software, in 11 government reports (totalling 46,403 words) from around the world, setting out their government’s cybersecurity strategy. This analysis revealed 33 main concepts that were used in these reports and these were then ranked in terms of their prominence within the reports. At the top of this list was “security”; “crime” was ranked 24th.

Interestingly in this article Dupont, although a criminologist, does not use the term “crime” or “cybercrime” in his analysis to identify the insecurities of cyberspace. While “cybercrime” has become a common term within criminology (Yar, 2013), Dupont in his analysis is careful to articulate a broader understanding of cyber-harms and to demonstrate how governments, in their attempts to respond to these harms, are taking a distinctly forward-looking approach and are very deliberately signifying this through the use of the term “security” rather than “crime”. Throughout Dupont refers to these harms as risks, which governments are seeking to govern through “cybersecurity solutions” designed to reduce the likelihood of the realization of these risks as harms. Within his analysis Dupont, implicitly rather than explicitly, recognizes yet another foundational order, namely, the order of cyberspace, which



governing authorities are seeking in support of human well-being, in this case a digital well-being. He also in his work recognizes, again implicitly rather than explicitly, that the governance of cyber security displays clear resonances with the notions of the unremitting watch that shaped Peel's vision of policing (Dupont, 2008).

Conclusion

In this chapter we have traced the way criminology, and the practical politics it mirrors, has been redefining its understanding of security and its governance. We have conceived of these developments in terms of two related themes. The first of these has been a broadening of the way in which safety, as a desirable governance objective, has been understood. The second has been a shift in governance strategies from a focus on realised harms (past-focused) to a focus on the risks of harms (future-focused).

Criminology finds itself in the midst of a rapidly shifting practical politics that is redefining its understanding and approach to safety. Within this context criminology has been engaged in an uneven game of catch-up that has created different, and often inconsistent, pockets of criminological thinking about security. Much of the emerging thinking in criminology, and within practical politics, is focusing attention on the risks of a broad range of harms. Within this thinking the term "security" is being used to identify this focus – a focus that is actively re-imagining criminology as being as much a risk-ology, and a security-ology, as it is a crime-ology.



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